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Determining the Sentencing Range and the Sentence
ithin Range: Mo de Sentencing Guidelines §§1.2=18
Model Sentencing Guidelines §1.2 General Application
Instructions
Except as specifically directed, the provisions of these
Model Sentencing Guidelines are to be applied as follows:
(a) Determine the offense guideline applicable to each
charged offense;
(b) In a case which is to be tried to a jury or to the court,
prior to the commencement of trial, identify from the
Chapter Two guideline applicable to each charged
offense the sentencing facts necessary to determina-
tion of the defendant's offense level for each offense,
and identify any sentencing facts necessary to estab-
lishing the applicability of any aggravating
adjustments from Chapter Three of the Model Sen-
tencing Guidelines that could increase the defendant's
offense level. In a case tried to a jury, provide appro-
priate instructions and special verdict forms to the
jury as to each sentencing fact the jury is to determine.
(c) In a case which is to be resolved by plea, prior to the
entry of a plea of guilty, identify from the Chapter Two
guideline applicable to each charged offense the sen-
tencing facts necessary to determination of the
defendant's offense level for each offense, and identify
any sentencing facts necessary to establishing the
applicability of any aggravating adjustments from
Chapter Three of the Model Sentencing Guidelines
that could increase the defendant's offense level.
(d) Based upon the verdict rendered in a jury or bench
trial, or upon the particulars of the defendant's guilty
plea, determine the defendant's offense level for each
offense of conviction.
(e) If there are multiple counts of conviction, apply Model
Sentencing Guidelines I.4 to group the counts and
adjust the offense level accordingly.
(f) Apply the adjustment for the defendant's acceptance of
responsibility from Model Sentencing Guidelines 3.7,
where applicable.
(g) Determine the defendant's criminal history category
pursuant to Chapter Four of the Model Sentencing
Guidelines.
(h) Determine the existence of any aggravating or mitigat-
ing factor relevant to determining the position of the
defendant's sentence within the guideline range.
(i) Determine from the commentary to Model Sentencing
Guidelines $i.i the sentencing requirements and
options related to probation, imprisonment, supervi-
sion conditions, fines, and restitution.
(j) Consider the departure provisions of Chapter Five of
the Model Sentencing Guidelines, and any other provi-
sion of the Model Sentencing Guidelines, relating to
whether a sentence below the otherwise applicable sen-
tencing range should be imposed.
Model Sentencing Guidelines §1.3 Determination of
Sentencing Range - Proof of Facts
(a) Any fact necessary to the determination of a defen-
dant's offense level on the Sentencing Table must be -
(i) found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury;
(2) found beyond a reasonable doubt by a judge in a
trial or sentencing hearing as to which the defen-
dant has waived the right to a jury;
(3) specifically admitted under oath or stipulated to by
the defendant at any time during the pendency of
the case;
(4) found beyond a reasonable doubt by a jury, or by a
judge in a case in which the defendant waived the
right to a jury, in another case in which the defen-
dant was a party, was represented by counsel, and
had motive and opportunity to contest the finding.
(b) Facts necessary to determination of a defendant's crim-
inal history category shall be determined by the
sentencing judge.
Model Sentencing Guidelines §1.4 Determining Offense
Level on Multiple Counts
(a) When a defendant has been convicted of more than
one count, the court shall:
i. Group the counts of conviction into Groups of Closely
Related Counts ("Groups") by applying the rules spec-
ified in Model Sentencing Guidelines VI.4(c).
ii. Determine the offense level applicable to each
Group by applying the rules specified in Model Sen-
tencing Guidelines Vs.4 (d).
iii. Determine the combined offense level applicable to
all Groups taken together by applying the rules
specified in Model Sentencing Guidelines Vs4(e).
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(b) Exclude from the application of Model Sentencing
Guidelines Vi.4(c)-(e) the following:
i. Any count for which the statute (A) specifies a term
of imprisonment to be imposed; and (B) requires
that such term of imprisonment be imposed to run
consecutively to any other term of imprisonment.
ii. Any count of conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1o28A.
(c) All counts involving substantially the same harm shall
be grouped together into a single Group. Counts
involve substantially the same harm when:
i. Counts involve the same victim and the same act or
transaction;
ii. Counts involve the same victim and two or more
acts or transactions connected by a common crimi-
nal objective or constituting part of a common
scheme or plan;
iii. One of the counts embodies conduct that is treated
as a specific offense characteristic in, or other
adjustment to, the guideline applicable to another
of the counts; or
iv. The offense level is determined largely on the basis
of the total amount of harm or loss, the quantity of a
substance involved, or some other measure of
aggregate harm, or if the offense behavior is ongo-
ing or continuous in nature and the guideline is
written to cover such behavior.
[Drafter's Note: A section listing particular
offense guidelines that should and should not be
grouped, see U.S.S.G. §3 DI.2, is omitted, but might
be desirable in a completed system.]
(d) Determine the offense level applicable to each of the
Groups as follows:
i. In the case of counts grouped together pursuant to
Model Sentencing Guidelines \I.4(c)(i)-(iii), the
offense level applicable to the Group is the offense
level for the most serious of the counts comprising
the Group, i.e., the highest offense level of the
counts in the Group.
ii. In the case of counts grouped together pursuant to
Model Sentencing Guidelines §i.4(c)(iv), the
offense level applicable to the Group is the offense
level corresponding to the aggregated quantity,
determined in accordance with Chapter Two of the
Model Sentencing Guidelines, plus any other
offense level adjustments called for by Chapters
Two, Three, and Five of the Model Sentencing
Guidelines and authorized by appropriate findings
of fact or defendant admissions pursuant to Model
Sentencing Guidelines i.3. When the counts
involve offenses of the same general type to which
different guidelines apply, apply the offense guide-
line that produces the highest offense level.
(e) The combined offense level in a case involving more
than one Group is determined by taking the offense
level of the Group with the highest offense level and
adjusting that offense level as indicated in the follow-
ing table:
Number of Units Increase in Offense Level
I None
I1Ia None
2 - 2'/. Court may add I level
3 - 3%/. Add I level
4 or more Court may add 2 levels
In determining the number of Units for purposes of
this section:
i. Count as one Unit the Group with the highest
offense level. Count one additional Unit for each
Group that is equally serious or one offense level
less serious;
ii. Count as one-half Unit any Group that is two
offense levels less serious than the Group with the
highest offense level;
iii. Disregard any Group that is three or more offense
levels less serious than the Group with the highest
offense level. Such Groups will not increase the
applicable offense level, but may be viewed as an
aggravating factor to be considered by the court in
setting the defendant's sentence within the applica-
ble sentencing range.
Application Notes:
1. The multi-count rule in Model Sentencing Guidelines
Jf.4(e) states that a sentencing court "may" add offense lev-
els if the number of "Units" attributable to groups of closely
related counts of conviction is 2-2 'A (corresponding to a
possible one-level increase) or 4 or more (corresponding to a
possible two-level increase). Use of the word "may" means
that the presence of the requisite number of Units empow-
ers, but does not requires the court to sentence the defendant
within a sentencing range higher than would otherwise be
the case. The court is only required to increase the defen-
dant's offense level if there are 3-3'/2 Units (requiring a
one-offense-level increase).
Model Sentencing Guidelines §1.5 Determination of
Sentence Within Range-Proof of Facts
(a) Any aggravating or mitigating fact upon which the sen-
tencing judge relies in determining the position of a
defendant's sentence within a sentencing range must be
found by the judge by a preponderance of the evidence.
(b) As to any aggravating fact disputed by the defendant,
the government bears the burden of proving such fact
by a preponderance of the evidence.
(c) As to any mitigating fact disputed by the government,
the defendant bears the burden of proving such fact by
a preponderance of the evidence.
(d) Information submitted to the probation officer in con-
nection with a presentence investigation or relied upon
by the sentencing judge in determining a defendant's
sentence must be disclosed to the parties in accordance
with [Proposed] Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
32(c)(3) and 32(c)(4).'
(e) Disputed facts must be proven with reliable evidence.
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Model Sentencing Guidelines §1.6 Determination of
Aggravating Factors Relevant to Sentence Within Range
["Relevant Conduct"]
The existence of aggravating factors relevant to determina-
tion of a defendant's sentence within the applicable
sentencing range shall be based on the following:
(a) (i) all acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted,
counseled, commanded, induced, procured, or will-
fully caused by the defendant during the
commission of the offense of conviction, in prepa-
ration for that offense, in the course of attempting
to avoid detection of or responsibility for that
offense, or as part of the same course of conduct or
common scheme or plan as that offense; and
(2) in the case of jointly undertaken criminal activity (a
criminal plan, scheme, endeavor, or enterprise
undertaken by the defendant in concert with others,
whether or not charged as a conspiracy), all reason-
ably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in
furtherance of the jointly undertaken criminal activ-
ity, that occurred during the commission of the
offense of conviction, in preparation for that
offense, or in the course of attempting to avoid
detection of or responsibility for that offense;
(b) all harm foreseeable to the defendant that resulted
from the acts and omissions described in subsections
(a)(I) and (a)(2) above, and all harm that was the object
of such acts and omissions; and
(c) any other information specified in the applicable
guideline.
Model Sentencing Guidelines §1.7 Determination of
Sentence Within Range-Federally Acquitted Conduct
Determination of facts relevant to determination of a
defendant's sentence within the applicable sentencing
range shall not be made on the basis of any conduct of
which the defendant was acquitted in a jury or bench trial
conducted in a court of the United States, including U.S.
District Courts and courts of the District of Columbia.
This prohibition does not apply to acquittals in the courts
of any State or foreign country.
Model Sentencing Guidelines §1.8 Determination of
Sentence Within Range-Statement of Reasons and
Appellate Review
(a) The sentencing judge shall, in every case, provide a
meaningful statement of reasons for the sentence
imposed. This statement of reasons shall include find-
ings of fact as to all facts that the court considered
relevant and material to determining the defendant's
sentence within the applicable range, including but not
limited to facts listed in the applicable guideline as
facts that a sentencing judge should consider in assign-
ing a sentence within the applicable range.
(b) The length of a defendant's sentence within the appli-
cable range shall be reviewable on appeal, but may not
be overturned except upon a finding of an abuse of
judicial discretion or of one or more clearly erroneous
findings of fact regarding a fact or facts material to the
court's exercise of its discretion.
DRAFTER'S COMMENTARY
General observations on determination of facts relat-
ing to offense seriousness: Drafting language for these
sections requires resolution of the tension between sev-
eral competing objectives-the general desire for
procedural regularity at sentencing that informed the
original sentencing guidelines, the longstanding criticism
(voiced most recently by the Constitution Project Sen-
tencing Initiative (CPSI)) that the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines still provide inadequate procedural protec-
tions for defendants,' the nascent principle of Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence favoring increased jury partic-
ipation in the finding of facts relevant to sentencing,3 and
the overarching desire for simplicity and flexibility
embodied in the reform recommendations of the CPSI4
and other interested observers.5 For example, in the sim-
plified system proposed here, those facts that determine
the offense level on the model grid will be subject to
markedly enhanced procedural rigor because, by constitu-
tional command, they must be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt or admitted by the defendant.6 How-
ever, this consequence of Blakely and Booker begs the
question of how to treat other facts relating to offense
seriousness which do not determine sentencing range,
but which a judge considers in setting a sentence within a
range. Considerations of fairness and procedural regular-
ity suggest that judges should still be required to make
formal findings of such facts and that evidence relating to
such facts should still be subject to discovery obligations.
Nonetheless, one might argue that retention of these pro-
cedural requirements for facts that have no
predetermined quantifiable effect on sentencing out-
comes vitiates some of the hoped-for gains in terms of
simplicity. Put plainly, if parties still must prove and
judges still must find facts with only advisory effects, how
much simpler would the resulting system really be?
The most basic response to these concerns is that, as a
matter of principle, it cannot be right for a judge to justify
an increase in a defendant's sentence based on a fact that
the judge is unprepared to find the existence of, even by a
preponderance of the evidence. It is one thing to say that a
judge may properly employ the existence of a particular
fact as a rationale for imposition of a particular sentence
even though the law does not specify in advance the quan-
titative effect of that fact. It is another thing altogether to
permit a judge to justify a sentencing decision based on
the existence of a "fact" that may, so far as the record
reveals, not be a fact at all. A system which permits that
outcome has abandoned any pretension to being a system
of law. Moreover, if sentences are to be reviewable on
appeal, the trial court must explain its sentence in relation
to factual findings based on record evidence in order for
the appellate court to perform the review function.
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As for the question of simplicity, under the current sys-
tem in which guidelines facts have mandatory sentencing
consequences, most factual issues at sentencing are
resolved by agreement between the parties. There is no
reason to believe that this would not continue to be true in
a system in which most disputed facts would have only an
advisory and quantitatively indeterminate effect on sen-
tence length. Indeed, the elimination of quantification of
sentencing values for most facts would doubtless encour-
age even more informal resolution of factual disputes,
with a corresponding decrease in the incidence of factual
disputes requiring formal judicial resolution.
Burdens of proof: Model Sentencing Guidelines i.5
embodies two general principles. First, disputed facts rele-
vant to determination of a defendant's sentence within the
range determined by trial or plea must be proven to a pre-
ponderance of the evidence by the party asserting the
existence of such facts. Second, proof of disputed facts
must be based on "reliable evidence." Model Sentencing
Guidelines I.5(e). Constraints of space and time did not
permit a more detailed explication here of the procedural
rules that should apply in contested sentencing hearings.
However, the working group expressed particular concern
about the position adopted by a number of circuits that
accords evidentiary weight to a fact merely by virtue of its
having been asserted in the Probation Department's pre-
sentence investigation report and requires defendants to
disprove factual assertions in the PSR with which they dis-
agree. 7 In our view, the circuits which have taken this
position are misguided. Attaching evidentiary weight to
facts in the PSR transforms probation officers into de
facto special masters of sentencing facts, thus denying the
parties the procedural protections that would attend a
hearing in open court and at the same time failing to spec-
ify any meaningful rules governing how the probation
officer is to exercise his factfinding responsibilities.8 In
this set of Model Guidelines, we have said only that dis-
puted facts relevant to setting a sentence within range
must be established by "reliable evidence." Model Sen-
tencing Guidelines Si.5(e). In any effort to transform these
Model Guidelines into a set of real guidelines, the ques-
tion of what constitutes "reliable evidence" and the
procedural rules governing judicial findings of sentencing
facts should receive considerable attention.
Bifurcation of sentencing proceedings: One question
presented by a sentencing system in which juries decide
facts not specified by statute as elements of the substan-
tive offense is whether the jury proceedings relating to
such sentencing facts should, or could, be conducted sepa-
rately from the proceedings relating to guilt. Put simply,
does the model proposed here require, or permit, bifur-
cated sentencing proceedings? We do not definitively
answer that question here. However, several points seem
reasonably dear. First, in the ordinary case, bifurcation
should probably not be required or encouraged. Most of
the factors committed to jury determination by these
model guidelines are facts that would already be presented
to the jury in some form or could easily be presented
within the framework of a trial on the question of guilt.
For example, the quantity of drugs involved in a drug case,
the amount of loss in a fraud case, the defendant's role in
group crime, and the degree of victim injury in an assault
case are currently points on which some evidence is com-
monly adduced, even if the jury is not asked for specific
findings, and the additional evidence that might be neces-
sary to permit a jury to make findings would, in most
instances, fit seamlessly into the government's presenta-
tion.
There might be cases in which a defendant would be
faced with some tactical difficulties in a consolidated trial,
as, for example, if he wanted to contest both his participa-
tion in a drug case and the amount of drugs involved. ("I
didn't possess the cocaine, but if I did, I only had four
kilos, not five.") There are at least two responses to this
complaint. One might say simply that the possibility of
such tactical embarrassments is the price defendants will
have to pay for a system that imposes on the government
the burden of proving some sentencing facts beyond a rea-
sonable doubt. A more nuanced position might create a
presumption favoring unitary trials, but provide that
judges should have discretion, for good cause shown, to
bifurcate proceedings on sentencing facts that, if
addressed in the guilt phase, would present particular
obstacles to achieving a fair trial.
Another situation in which juries might address sen-
tencing facts separately from guilt would be one in which
the defendant wished to plead guilty to the substantive
offense, but contest the government's allegations on cer-
tain sentencing facts determinative of offense level. In such
a case, it might seem advantageous to the court and the
parties to permit the defendant to enter a plea to the sub-
stantive offense and contest the disputed sentencing facts
to a jury empanelled for the purpose. These Model Guide-
lines do not specifically authorize or preclude such an
option; however, the language of Model Sentencing Guide-
lines 1.3(a)(2) implies the possibility of a jury sentencing
proceeding separate from the trial on the question of guilt.
The Multi-Count Rules: Like the current Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines, model guidelines of the sort proposed
here require rules for determination of offense level in
cases involving more than one count of conviction. The
rules set forth in Model Sentencing Guidelines 5i.4 closely
track the language and effect of the existing Guidelines,
U.S.S.G. f 3Di.i - 3DI.5. There is one notable innovation.
Under the existing guidelines, a determination that the
groups of closely related counts generate a certain number
of "Units," as described in U.S.S.G. 3Di 4 , requires that
the defendant's offense level be increased in accordance
with the chart in that guideline. By contrast, under the
Model Guidelines, the presence of a certain number of
"Units" does not always require an offense level increase.
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At two points, the Model Guidelines permit, but do not
require, an offense level increase.
Several considerations entered into this approach.
First, in both the existing and model systems, the smallest
possible increase in offense level is one level. However,
the effect of a one-level increase is much greater in the
Model Guidelines than it is under the existing Federal
Sentencing Guidelines. Given that the existing Sentencing
Table is composed of overlapping ranges, a one-offense
level increase imposes no necessary increase in sentence
and the maximum effect of one such increase is fairly
small. Under the Model Guidelines, a one-offense-level
increase always generates a sentencing range with a mini-
mum sentence that begins at the maximum sentence of
the next-lowest range, and because the ranges in the
Model Guidelines Table are generally broader than those
of the existing system, the difference in potential sentenc-
ing exposure between one range and the next highest
range is greater. Consequently, there is less ability in the
model system to fine-tune the effects of a multi-count con-
viction. (This is one instance in which a complicated
sentencing table with forty-three vertical levels comes in
handy.)
Second, the rule of Blakely and Booker is that, although
jury findings of fact are necessary to permit a judge to sen-
tence above the top of the otherwise applicable limit, such
jury findings do not require the judge to do so. The Model
Guidelines take advantage of this feature of the Court's
holdings to expand a judge's upward discretion without
mandating its exercise. In effect, the fine tuning that the
current Federal Sentencing Guidelines now attempt
through one-offense-level adjustments would be delegated
to judges.
Finally, even though the calculation of "Units" would
be done by the sentencing judge, in my view this approach
does not offend Booker because the judge's work would be
a legal determination of the proper application of the
Model Guidelines' multicount rules to the facts embraced
by the trial verdict or the contents of the defendant's plea.
Several members of the group working on this project felt
that Booker might be implicated by this model guideline. It
was suggested that the determination of whether several
counts were or were not parts of a common scheme or
plan is sufficiently factual in nature that the issue should
be submitted to a jury. My sense is that this and similar
questions presented for the sentencing court's determina-
tion by this model guideline are at most mixed questions
of fact and law that could constitutionally be determined
by the court without jury intervention. However, I may
well be wrong and the point merits discussion.
"Relevant conduct": A persistent criticism of the exist-
ing Federal Sentencing Guidelines has been that facts
found by judges, but never submitted to juries, can
markedly enhance a defendant's guideline sentencing
range. This critique is known by the colorful sobriquet of
"the tail wagging the dog." Two notable features of the
Guidelines have given this critique particular force. First,
the Guidelines for most offenses consist of a fairly low
"Base Offense Level" (BOL) associated with mere convic-
tion of a particular crime, plus a fairly lengthy list of
"Specific Offense Characteristics" (SOCs), that, if found,
increase the defendant's sentencing range above the level
set in the Base Offense Level. Accordingly, the guideline
sentencing range based upon mere conviction is often
quite low, while the range produced by adding to the BOL
upward adjustments for all the SOCs found post-convic-
tion by the judge is much higher.9 Second, pursuant to the
"relevant conduct" rules of the Guidelines, judges deter-
mining whether SOCs exist are directed to consider
conduct beyond the particular offense or offenses of which
the defendant was convicted. Judges thus will often set
sentencing ranges based on uncharged, unconvicted, or
even acquitted conduct, so long as such conduct bears a
sufficiently close relation to the offense of conviction and
is proven at sentencing to a preponderance.
Whether the tail-wags-dog critique identifies a real
problem or only one of perception is subject to reasonable
debate. On the one hand, judges in the pre-Guidelines era
plainly considered conduct beyond the ambit of the
offense of conviction in setting sentences without even a
requirement that they admit to doing so, while the Guide-
lines at least identified those facts that would count and
required the government to prove them on the record.
Moreover, limiting sentencing judges to consideration of
the offense of conviction is an invitation to sentence
manipulation during the plea bargaining process. On the
other hand, unlike the pre-Guidelines era, the Guidelines
accord a quantifiable effect to facts outside the ambit of
the offense of conviction, facts that need not have been
presented to a jury, and accord these quantifiable effects to
facts proven only to a preponderance of the evidence in
proceedings shorn of many of the procedural protections
that characterize a trial on the merits. As discussed above,
the contrast between guidelines sentencing procedures
and the trial process is particularly stark in circuits which
have conferred evidentiary weight on any fact appearing in
the Probation Department's presentence investigation
report.
Whatever one's views on the dog-wagging propensities
of the pre- or post-Booker Federal Sentencing Guidelines,
the sentencing model endorsed by the Constitution Pro-
ject and elaborated here solves the tail-wags-dog problem.
Under this system, one can no longer complain that a
defendant's sentence will be increased above the maxi-
mum authorized by the jury's findings or the defendant's
plea of guilty because the facts found by the jury or admit-
ted by plea (in combination with criminal history)
determine the defendant's sentencing range. Unconvicted
conduct cannot raise the maximum sentence above that
range. In the model system, sentencing judges will still be
able to consider aggravating facts not proven at trial or
admitted by plea, but only as to the proper sentence within
the assigned sentencing range. In addition, in the model
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system, with a few possible exceptions,'0 facts found by
judges post-conviction have no predetermined quantitative
effect - they are advisory only.
Finally, the scope of aggravating facts a judge may con-
sider in setting the sentence within the applicable range has
been somewhat narrowed by Model Sentencing Guidelines
§1.6 in comparison to the existing "relevant conduct" rule
under U.S.S.G. §I1I.3. The Model Guideline would still per-
mit consideration of conduct not specifically included in the
offense(s) of conviction. However, it would permit consider-
ation of unconvicted conduct that was "part of the same
course of conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense
of conviction" only if the defendant himself actually "co m -
mitted, aided, abetted, counseled, commanded, induced,
procured, or willfully caused" the unconvicted conduct.
Model Sentencing Guidelines §i.6(a). The Model Guideline
would limit consideration of unconvicted conduct that was
merely the foreseeable consequence of the conduct of a
defendant's criminal partners. Under the existing Guide-
lines, the foreseeable conduct of one's criminal partners
may be considered even if it occurred as part of an uncon-
victed offense, so long as that offense was part of the same
course of conduct or common scheme or plan as an offense
of conviction. U.S.S.G. §iBi.3(a)(2). Under Model Guide-
lines i.6, the foreseeable conduct of criminal partners
could be considered if it occurred in furtherance of one of
the offenses of conviction, but not if it occurred as part of
some unconvicted offense. Finally, Model Sentencing
Guideline i.6(b) modifies the provision of the current
Guidelines that includes as relevant conduct "all harm that
resulted from" the specified acts of the defendants and his
co-venturers, U.S.S.G. SiBI.3(a)(3). The Model Guideline
directs the court to consider only harms "foreseeable" to the
defendant. This modification brings the existing guideline
into conformity with general criminal law principles. More-
over, it is doubtful that the current Guidelines provision has
often been applied to enhance a defendant's punishment
based on unforeseeable harms.
This is a very difficult area. It will doubtless be the
focus of considerable debate during any serious effort to
reconfigure the guidelines. Further refinement of the
model rule may well be deemed desirable.
Acquitted conduct: This model guideline adopts the
CPSI position (and that of numerous critics) precluding
use of acquitted conduct to enhance a sentence. However,
in consideration of the double jeopardy and dual sover-
eignty issues presented by attempting to bar the use of
conduct as to which there was arguably an acquittal in a
state or foreign court, the prohibition is limited to acquit-
tals in federal court. Whether the bar to the use of
acquitted conduct should be extended to acquittals in non-
federal courts is a question left for further study.
Statement of Reasons and Appellate Review: In any
system of law worthy of the name, judges should offer
meaningful explanations of the decisions they reach. Such
explanations allow the parties and the public to under-
stand the outcome of the case and, as to issues on which
appellate review is possible, are essential to the informed
exercise of the appellate function. Observers of the federal
sentencing system have long called for sentencing judges
to provide more detailed statements of the reasons behind
their sentencing choices." Under these Model Guidelines,
sentencing opinions will be of even greater importance
than formerly. Whereas under the existing Guidelines
judicial findings of guidelines facts have preset quantita-
tive effects on the sentencing range, 2 the vast majority of
post-conviction judicial findings of fact in the model sys-
tem would have no preset quantitative effect. 3 Rather,
they would be aggravating or mitigating factors that the
sentencing judge would consider in assigning a sentence
within the range set by jury finding or guilty plea. For the
parties to understand the resulting sentence and for an
appellate court to review that sentence, a detailed and well-
reasoned statement of reasons will be essential.
It may well be that the rules requiring a statement of
reasons and creating a right of appellate review of within-
range sentences embodied in Model Guideline Si.8 should
be supplemented by a statute or rule of criminal procedure.
Notes
1 The reference is to expanded sentencing discovery rules pro-
posed in the Constitution Project Sentencing Initiative,
Recommendations for Federal Criminal Sentencing in a Post-
Booker World, 18 FED. SENT. REP. 310 (2006) (hereinafter
"CPSI, Recommendations").
2 Id. at 312-313.
3 See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), and United
States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005).
4 CPSI, Recommendations, supra note 1, at 314.
5 See, e.g., R. Barry Ruback & Jonathan Wroblewski, The Fed-
eral Sentencing Guidelines: Psychological and Policy Reasons
for Simplification, 7 PSYCHOL, PUB. POL. & LAW 739 (2001); ABA
Justice Kennedy Commission, Report on Punishment, Incar-
ceration, and Sentencing (available at http://
www.manningmedia.net/Clients/ABA/ABA288/).
6 United States v. Booker, 125 S.Ct. 738 (2005).
7 See United States v. Prochner, 417 F3d 54, 66 (1st Cir 2005)
("PSR generally bears 'sufficient indicia of reliability,"' that
defendant must rebut with "countervailing proof ... beyond
defendant's self-serving words"); United States v. Huerta, 182
F3d 361, 364 (5th Cir 1999) ("sentencing judge may con-
sider [PSR] as evidence in making the factual
determinations," and "defendant's rebuttal evidence must
demonstrate that the information contained in the PSR is
Imaterially untrue, inaccurate or unreliable,' and '[m]ere
objections do not suffice"'); United States v. Hall, 109 F3d
1227, 1233 (7th Cir. 1997) ("When the district court adopts
the PSR's findings [here, probation officer's extrapolation of
weight from dollar amounts mentioned by drug addicted
informant who did not testify in person], the defendant must
offer more than a bare denial of its factual allegations to
mount a successful challenge."); United States v. Terry, 916
F2d 157, 160-62 (4th Cir. 1990) ("defendant has an affirma-
tive duty to make a showing that the information in the
presentence report is unreliable," and unless the defendant
carries that burden, the "court is 'free to adopt the findings
of the [presentence report] without more specific inquiry or
explanation.").
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8 For a discussion of this and other procedural deficiencies in
the current Federal Sentencing Guidelines, see Frank 0. Bow-
man, Ill, Completing the Sentencing Revolution: Reconsidering
Sentencing Procedure in the Guidelines Era, 12 FED. SENT. REP.
187 (2000) (discussing procedural deficiencies of Guidelines
and summarizing other articles on same theme in Vol. 12,
No. 4 of the FEDERAL SENTENCING REPORTER).
In drug cases sentenced under U.S.S.G. §2D1.1, the base
offense level is variable, depending on the type and quantity of
the drug. However, because drug quantity is customarily
determined by the court post-conviction, the effect is the
same.
10 This model permits several possible approaches to guiding
the exercise of judicial discretion within the applicable guide-
line range. One approach is to make all factors relevant to
determination of a within-range sentence advisory only. A sec-
ond possibility is to identify some small subset of sentencing
factors that would not be submitted to juries, but if found
post-conviction by the sentencing judge, would trigger a pre-
sumption of a sentence above or below the midpoint of the
applicable range. A mechanism of this sort is proposed as an
alternative in the general guideline on causing or risking
injury, Model Sentencing Guidelines § 3.3, 18 FED. SENT. REP.
366-367 (2006), the enhancement for obstruction of justice
during the offense of conviction, Model Sentencing Guidelines
§35, 18 FED. SENT. REP. 368 (2006) and the economic crime
guideline, Model Sentencing Guidelines §281(c), 18 FED. SENT.
REP. 330 (2006), and the advantages and disadvantages of
such an approach are discussed at length in Frank 0. Bow-
man, Ill, Editor's Observations, 'Tis a Gift to Be Simple: A
Model Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 18 FED.
SENT REP. 310 (2006).
1 See, e.g., Marc L. Miller, Guidelines Are Not Enough: The
Need for Written Sentencing Opinions, 7 BEHAV, Sci. & LAW 3
(1989); Douglas A. Berman, A Common Law for This Age of
Federal Sentencing: The Opportunity and Need for Judicial Law-
making, 11 STAN. L. & PO'Y REV. 93 (1999); Steven L.
Chanenson, Write On!, THE YALE LAW JOURNAL POCKET PART
(available at http://www.thepocketpart.org/2O06/07/pdfs/
Chanenson formatted.pdf); Steven L. Chanenson, Guidance
from Above and Beyond, 58 STAN. L. REV. 175 (2005). See also,
ABA Justice Kennedy Commission Report on Punishment,
Incarceration and Sentencing, supra note 5 (recommending
that states, territories, and the federal government "[r]equire
a sentencing court to state on the record reasons for increas-
ing or decreasing a presumptive sentence, and permit
appellate review of any sentence so imposed").
12 Of course, post.Booker the sentencing range produced by
judicial findings of guidelines facts is at least nominally only
advisory.
13 As discussed supra note 7, one option discussed in these Model
Guidelines is to identify some small subset of facts that, if
found, would generate a presumption of a sentence above or
below the midpoint of the applicable range. If this option is
adopted, then facts generating such a presumption would have a
predetermined quantitative effect, albeit only a presumptive one.
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